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EconoScope | Hoshine case puts U.S. forced-labor enforcement to the test_我的网站

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[ 资讯] 日前,捷尼赛思2026年产品计划曝光,计划推出5款新产品,包括纯电动旗舰SUV——GV90 EV,采用混合动力的轿车和SUV——G80 HEV、GV80 HEV和GV70 HEV,以及首款增程动力车型——GV70 EREV。
GV90 EV谍照
具体来看,2026年率先到来的将会是GV90 EV,该车将会在韩国的现代蔚山工厂生产,其基于全新“eM”专属平台打造,计划年产能21000台,预计售价超过1亿韩元(约人民币52.8万元)。结合此前消息,新车将会延续Neolun概念车的设计理念,同时它还有望提供四座版本、配备L3级驾驶辅助系统、搭载113kWh电池组、配备空气悬架和后轮转向等等,其续航里程有望超过800km。
Neolun概念车
GV80 HEV计在2026年第三季度推出,其将采用2.5L发动机与电机组成的混动系统;G80 HEV则会在第四季度推出,并会采用与GV80 HEV相同的动力总成。第四季度还会带来GV70 EREV,该车未来也会引入中国市场销售。

B |     (ECNS) -- U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies over alleged “forced labor” are facing growing scrutiny, both over the facts behind such accusations and the legal procedures used to enforce them.    Recently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Department of Homeland Security, updated its records to remove Hoshine Silicon (Jia Xing) Co., Ltd., a Chinese photovoltaic supply-chain company, from the scope of a Withhold Release Order (WRO) related to alleged forced labor in Xinjiang.        Li Guogang, senior legal counsel at Tahota Law Firm who represented Hoshine Silicon, told China News Network that this is the first known case of a Chinese company being removed from the scope of such a U.S. enforcement measure related to Xinjiang. He described it as a milestone for Chinese companies seeking to challenge U.S. actions involving alleged forced labor.    From being targeted to having to prove its innocence    In recent years, the U.S. has repeatedly used WROs and Xinjiang-related legislation to impose trade restrictions on Chinese companies.    For businesses caught up in such enforcement measures, proving that their products and supply chains are not connected to alleged forced labor can become a major hurdle.    The Hoshine case highlights the difficult burden placed on companies facing such measures. Rather than authorities being required to disclose the full basis for their allegations through a transparent process, affected companies may find themselves having to submit extensive evidence to demonstrate that the accusations against them are unfounded.    “We submitted 4,000 to 5,000 pages of materials, including audit results and detailed explanations of the supply chain, to demonstrate that the allegations of forced labor against Hoshine Silicon were without factual basis,” Li said.    The company’s experience also shows how difficult it can be for businesses to challenge such enforcement actions. According to Li, U.S. customs authorities initially rejected Hoshine Silicon’s applications for removal twice.    The situation changed after the company took the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade. The dispute subsequently moved through judicial proceedings, and the enforcement measure was eventually lifted as it applied to Hoshine Silicon.    The shift from administrative enforcement to judicial review is significant. It shows that when allegations lack sufficient factual support, legal procedures can still provide companies with an important avenue to seek relief and challenge government decisions.    The significance goes beyond one company    The significance of the Hoshine case lies in more than one company being removed from the scope of a U.S. trade restriction.    In recent years, U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies have expanded far beyond traditional tariffs, extending into supply chains, investment, technology and national security. Issues involving Xinjiang and alleged military ties have also increasingly become part of Washington’s economic policy toolkit toward China.    One direct result is greater uncertainty for Chinese companies seeking to enter or operate in the U.S. market. Businesses must consider not only product prices, quality and competitiveness, but also the additional risks created by shifts in U.S. domestic politics and regulatory policy.    China’s Ministry of Commerce has repeatedly stated that Xinjiang enjoys social stability, economic development and improving living standards, and that there is no forced labor of any kind in the region.    A recent case involving Chinese pharmaceutical and life-sciences company WuXi AppTec offers another example worth watching. The company has also challenged its designation by the U.S. Department of Defense as a “Chinese military company.”    A U.S. court recently granted WuXi AppTec a preliminary injunction, temporarily blocking the designation while the case proceeds. The court found that the company was likely to succeed in arguing that the Defense Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, pointing to problems in how some of the evidence had been interpreted.    From Xinjiang-related restrictions to military-related designations, the U.S. government has increasingly brought political and national-security considerations into its treatment of Chinese companies.    When political tools are repeatedly used to blacklist Chinese businesses, the consequences go beyond the outcome of a single lawsuit. They can also affect global companies’ confidence in the predictability of the U.S. market and its legal and regulatory environment.    If companies must spend enormous amounts of time and money simply to demonstrate that allegations against them lack sufficient evidence, questions inevitably arise over whether confidence in U.S. market rules and legal institutions can be sustained.    Commercial rules ultimately depend on institutions that are stable, transparent and predictable.    When administrative power increasingly intervenes in normal international trade, and when market risks depend more heavily on political judgments, the impact extends beyond one company or one supply chain. It can shape global businesses’ long-term expectations of the stability and reliability of the U.S. market.    The cases of Hoshine Silicon and WuXi AppTec have therefore opened more than a gap in individual blacklists. They have exposed a potential crack in the broader machinery of U.S. sanctions and restrictions.    When allegations fail to withstand legal scrutiny and enforcement actions lack sufficient factual support, the credibility of those measures inevitably comes into question.    For Chinese companies, the message from these cases is clear: being placed under a U.S. restriction does not necessarily mark the end of the story. Evidence, legal procedures and judicial review can still challenge administrative decisions — and, in doing so, expose weaknesses in U.S. enforcement actions driven more by political considerations than by solid evidence.    (By Gong Weiwei)                            。另外还有一款GV70 HEV,它将会在美国工厂生产,并可能仅在韩国市场推出。关于新车的更多信息,我们也将持续关注报道。(文/ 郭辰)

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